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THEP ATHS NOTTAKEN:THE SUPREME
COURT'S FAILURES IN DICKERSON
Paul G. Cassell*

"Where's the rest of the opinion?" That was my immediate reac
tion to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, de
livered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its
release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had elimi
nated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as
it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my in
credulity grew.
Just six months earlier, the Court had appointed me to defend my
victory in the Fourth Circuit, where I had persuaded that court to hold
that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 validly replaced the "prophylactic" Miranda re
quirements as the standard for the admissibility of confessions in fed
eral court.1 My appointment stemmed from the Justice Department's
virtually unprecedented decision to align itself with the criminal de
fendant it was prosecuting in arguing against admitting his confession.
The Department and Dickerson filed briefs urging reversal of the
Fourth Circuit, supported by amicus briefs from the ACLU and sev
eral other civil rights organizations. I responded with a brief defending
the Fourth Circuit's decision, supported by amicus briefs from the
United States House of Representatives, leading Senators, seventeen
states, and many of the nation's law enforcement officials, prosecutors,

* James I. Farr Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law (cas
sellp@law.utah.edu). Thanks to those who offered suggestions on this Article, especially the
participants in this Symposium. Thanks also to the lawyers who helped me fight the good
fight during Dickerson in various ways, including Doug Beloof, Reg Brown, David Castro,
Dan Collins, Ted Cooperstein, Doug Cox, Bob Cyncar, Ron Eisenberg, Miguel
Estrada, Bruce Fein, Joe Grano, Sarah Hart, Chuck Hobson, Bob Hoyt, Gary Malphrus, Jim
Manek, Josh Marquis, Andy McBride, Edwin Meese III, Greg Munson, Michael O'Neil,
Patrick Philbin, Rick Romley, Devallis Rutledge, Kyle Sampson, Kent Scheidegger, Chris
Simpkins, Scott Sommerville, David Wilson, Ken Woodington, and especially Paul
Kamenar, Bill Otis, Lee Otis, and Trish Cassell.
I also want to extend a special note of thanks to Yale Kamisar for suggesting this
Symposium and, more generally, for all the interest he has shown in my work over the years.
In fact, my desire to pursue the Dickerson litigation was prompted, in part, by Yale's admis
sion to me a few years ago that he "wasn't sure" what the Supreme Court would do if it ever
faced § 3501. Yale, I should never have let you convince me to throw Miranda into the briar
patch!

1. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). For background of the litiga
tion leading to the Fourth Circuit's decision, see Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time For
got: 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 208-23 (1999).
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and victims' organizations. At oral argument in April, an active Court2
wrestled with the contending positions. Meanwhile, the press and
public awaited what many projected would be, regardless of the out
come, a landmark ruling.
Yet the case ended with a whimper, rather than a bang. On June
26, 2000, the Court announced it had reversed the decision below. The
rationale for the reversal was only briefly sketched out. The entire
majority opinion spans just a few pages (about eight in West's
Supreme Court Reporter).3 Only about half of those pages address the
substantive constitutional issues.4 The opinion briefly concludes that
Miranda announced a "constitutional rule," had "constitutional un
derpinnings," and was "constitutionally based."5 Surprisingly, at no
point does the majority explicate precisely what this means. Justice
Scalia's dissent highlights a critical omission in the majority opinion:
It takes only a small step ... [for the Court to] come out and say quite
clearly: "We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not pre
ceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution
of the United States." It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court
does not believe it.6

One would think this a sufficiently important issue for the majority to
respond to it - either to affirm or deny the claim. Yet the majority
did not trouble itself to answer.
The description of Miranda as a "constitutional rule" was sufficient
to achieve the Court's apparent twin aims: striking down § 3501 while
leaving in place its various decisions crafting exceptions to Miranda.7

2. I was interrupted for questions approximately sixty-two times in my thirty minute argument.
3. Dickerson v. United States, 1 20 S. Ct. 2326, 2329-37 ( 2000).
4. See 1 20 S. Ct. at 2332- 37.

5. Id. at 2334.
6. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

7. Others in this Symposium have articulated at great length reasons for believing
Dickerson does not change Miranda doctrine. See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda
to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . . , 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 893-94 ( 2001) ("What has been reaf
firmed, at least as far as the Chief Justice is concerned, is not the Miranda doctrine as it burst
on the scene in 1966, but Miranda with all its exceptions attached . . . . " ) ; Susan R. Klein,
Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071 (arguing that Dickerson
"holds that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson"); George C. Thomas I II, Sepa
rated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1081, 1 1 1 2 (2001) (arguing that Dickerson leaves exceptions to Miranda in place, but
locating Miranda rule in the Due Process Clause); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 1 21 , 1162 ( 2001) (noting that Dickerson
"left Miranda standing, but with all of the exceptions and modifications that have been
crafted during the last thirty-four years"). This conclusion seems unassailable, although an
intermediate appellate court from Colorado disagrees. See People v. Trujillo, 2000 WL
186 2933 (Colo. App. 2000). Both the text and rationale of Dickerson require leaving the pre
Dickerson exceptions in place, as the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained in a carefully
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But this result-oriented "success" came at the great cost of any pre
tense of consistency in the Court's doctrine. For example, Dickerson's
assertion that Miranda created a "constitutional" rule contradicts nu
merous clear statements in earlier opinions. Surprisingly, these state
ments can be traced to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the
Dickerson opinion. Although Miranda itself contains constitutional
language, then-Justice Rehnquist had written as early as 1974 in
Michigan v. Tucker" that Miranda's safeguards were "not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution . . . . "9 From this premise, the
Court allowed derivative evidence from a non-Mirandized statement
to be used against a defendant because "the police conduct at issue
here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylac
tic standards" of Miranda.10 Building on Tucker, in a series of cases
spanning nearly three decades, the Court repeated the characteriza
tion of Miranda rules as "prophylactic" and relied on that rationale to
limit the reach of Miranda.11 At the same time, numerous federal
courts of appeals reaching the issue had understood these statements
to mean that Miranda rights were not constitutional in character.12 In
deed, no less than the preeminent academic defender of Miranda Yale Kamisar - had also seemingly acknowledged that, under pre
vailing doctrine, Miranda rights were not constitutionally required.13

reasoned decision. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75 (Ten. 2001) (pre-Dickerson exceptions
to Miranda remain good law).
8. 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
9. Id. at 444.
10. Id. at 445-446
11. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (noting that Miranda is
"one of a series of recommended procedural safeguards" that are "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 & n.1(1985) (holding
that "a simple failure to administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth
Amendment"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) ("[T]he failure to provide
Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession involuntary.").
12. See, e.g., Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.
1995); DeShawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241,
1256 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1 135, 1 142 (4th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 168-70 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 182 (1998); United
States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181, 1 186 (6th Cir. 1990), reh'g en bane denied, 1991 U.S. App.
Lexis 3934; Clay v. Brown, 1 998 U.S. App. Lexis 17115, reported in table format, 151 F.3d
1032 (7th Cir.); Winsett v. Washington, 130 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1997); Warren v. City of
Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1441-42 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989);
United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1977); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d
1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1994); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976).
13. Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and
Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 970 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, "Fruits"]
("According to a majority of the present Court, [failure to follow Miranda] does not seem to
violate a constitutional right at all."). In a more detailed discussion of these issues, Kamisar
explained (accurately, it turns out!) why Miranda nonetheless has constitutional foundations.
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This issue of the Court's "deconstitutionalization" of Miranda lies
at the heart of the question presented in Dickerson. Yet, by my count,
the majority opinion devotes only three substantive sentences to ex
plaining why the Court's own, repeated statements should not be
taken at face value. The majority acknowledges that "language" in
some of its earlier opinions supports the view that Miranda rights are
not constitutionally required. But, the majority says, these cases prove
not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule, but only that "no consti
tutional rule is immutable."14 Instead, asserts the majority, such excep
tions are a "normal part of constitutional law."15 Chief Justice
Rehnquist does not pause to offer any explanation why then that lan
guage had been used in more than a half-dozen Supreme Court opin
ions on various Miranda issues.
The majority's cursory treatment of this central issue leaves
Miranda doctrine incoherent. As others in this Symposium have
pointed out,16 there is no rationale for numerous results over the last
twenty-five years. Why can the "fruits" of Miranda violations be used
against a defendant? The traditional rule excludes fruits of, for exam
ple, unconstitutional searches.17 In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court said
very specifically that the reason for not following the Fourth
Amendment rule in the Miranda context was that "a simple failure to
administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth
Amendment."18 The majority in Dickerson viewed these statements
not as "prov[ing] that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision" but
rather that "unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are
different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment."19 Again, in its haste to dispose of the case, the Court

See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 93650 (2000) [hereinafter Kamisar, Congress].

14. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 7, at 895 ("I usually discount criticism of a case when
made by losing counsel, but this time I am sympathetic when Paul Cassell complains [about]
the 'skimpy, jerry-built opinion . . . . '"); Klein, supra note 7, at 1071 (characterizing the "terri
ble" Dickerson opinion as a "squandered opportunity to rationalize contradictory case
law."); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958,
958 (2001) ("It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really answered" the central ques
tions posed in the case.); see also Barry Friedman & Michael C. Dorf, Shared Constitutional
Interpretation A fter Dickerson, N.Y.U. Law School Public Law and Legal Theory, Research
Paper No. 13 (Fall 2000) (concluding "a. Court brimming with its own importance has paid
insufficient attention to its core obligation: to explain the basis for its decisions. That short
coming is nowhere more obvious than in the line of post-Miranda cases culminating in
Dickerson.").
17. E.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-43 (1939).
18. Oregon 'v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298� 306 n.1 (1 985).
.
19. 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
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did not tarry to explain the difference.20 Similarly, in New York v.
Quarles, the Court carved out a "public safety" exception to Miranda.
The Fifth Amendment admits of no such public safety exception; the
. police cannot coerce an involuntary statement from a suspect and use
it against him even if there are strong public safety reasons for doing
so. The rationale Quarles gave, however, was that the Miranda rules
were nonconstitutional rules subject to modification by the Court.21
Dickerson hazards no attempt at explaining Quarles. In short, as Jus
tice Scalia's dissent cogently argues, the Court in Dickerson behaved
like "some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs
down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective
fancy."22 Or, as Akhil Amar has written, Dickerson reads like little
more than the pronouncement: "The Great and Powerful Oz Has
Spoken! "23
While other authors in this Symposium have discussed aspects of
this doctrinal incoherence at some length,24 the point I pursue here is
whether this doctrinal incoherence was necessary. Perhaps the Court
simply had no choice in the face of irreconcilable lines of cases. My
thesis is that Dickerson could have been written coherently - that the
Court could have crafted other resolutions that would have allowed it
to harmonize its doctrine far more effectively than the skimpy, jerry
built opinion the Court announced.
Part I describes a different path the Court could have taken to rec
oncile both its decisions describing Miranda as a sub-constitutional
rule and those applying Miranda to the states. The Court could have
treated Miranda as a form of constitutional common law, an interim
court-created remedy for the enforcement of Fifth Amendment rights.
That path would have been more consistent with Dickerson's empha
sis on respect for precedent and would have effectively reconciled all
of the Miranda cases.
Part II articulates still another path the Court could have followed
to sustain § 3501. The Court could have concluded that § 3501, bol
stered by improved tort remedies and other post-Miranda innovations
in the law, provided a viable substitute to Miranda.
Part III lays out yet another path available to the Court for sus
taining § 3501
and harmonizing its decisions. This section explains
-

20. This point is pursued in more detail, and in more powerful prose, in 120 S. Ct. 2326,
2342-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 n.7 (1984) (justifying holding on the
ground that "absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no constitutional imperative re
quiring the exclusion of the evidence that results from police inquiry of this kind").
22. 120 S. Ct. at 2342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 1 14 HARV. L. REV.
26, 89 n.212 (2000).
24. See supra note 16.
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how the Court's assertion of its power to promulgate Miranda con
flicted with its more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.25
Boerne regulated congressional enforcement of constitutional rights,
adding a "congruence and proportionality" requirement to any en
forcement scheme. Applying Boerne to j udicial enforcement of Fifth
Amendment rights - that is, to Miranda - reveals that Miranda's ex
clusionary rule lacks "congruence and proportionality" to the under
lying Fifth Amendment. The Court could have solved these problems
by viewing Miranda as creating a presumption of involuntariness that
could be rebutted by the prosecution.
Part IV addresses one last conflict between Dickerson and settled
doctrine. In Dickerson, the Court gives as a ground for not overruling
Miranda the lack of any significant harm to law enforcement. But
Congress has reached precisely the opposite conclusion. In numerous
other cases involving disputed factual questions, the Court has given
deference to congressional findings. Dickerson should have followed
these other decisions in evaluating whether to modify Miranda to up
hold § 3501.
Part V concludes with an exploration of how Dickerson might have
encouraged Congress to adopt alternatives to Miranda - alternatives
like videotaping of police interrogation - that might have offered a
way of better protecting suspects' rights during questioning and soci
ety's interest in obtaining voluntary confessions. The absence of any
discussion of alternatives to Miranda is Dickerson's most serious fail
ure.
I.

SECTION 3501 AS M ODIFICATION OF C ONSTITUTIONAL
C OMMON LAW

Perhaps the simplest way for the Court to reconcile its various
pronouncements was to treat Miranda as a form of "constitutional
common law," to use the phrase made famous in Henry Monaghan's
1 975 article in the Harvard Law Review.26 Under this view, the
Miranda rules are interim remedies not required by the Constitution,
but designed in the absence of legislation to assist in protecting consti
tutional rights. The Court has exercised such power in other cases,
perhaps most notably in the 1971 decision Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents.27 There the Court created the right to sue
the federal government for violations of constitutional rights - the so
called Bivens remedy. The Court has also crafted a judicially-devised
remedy for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights - the exclusionary
25. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
26. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REY. 1,
42 (1975).
27. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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rule of Mapp v. Ohio.28 Because the Court has crafted extraconstitu
tional measures, like the exclusionary rule, to protect constitutional
rights from infringement by the states,29 this understanding of Miranda
is consistent with its application to the states.30
For present purposes, the salient feature of constitutional common
law is that it is subject to change - change by the Court and, in ap
propriate cases, by Congress. The Bivens doctrine illustrates this evo
lutionary aspect. In subsequent cases, the Court has allowed Congress
to modify the Bivens structure, so long as an alternative adequate to
protect constitutional rights remains in place. In Bush v. Lucas,31 for
instance, the Court refused to allow a Bivens action by a federal
worker for a violation of First Amendment rights because Congress
had created a different remedy through federal personnel statutes. In
reaching this holding, the Court recognized that the other remedy was
not as fully effective as a judicially-created damages remedy.32 None
theless, the Court explained that the touchstone for assessing the con
stitutionality of Congress's remedial regime was not whether it
matched in every respect the judicially-devised regime for which it
substituted. Rather, the touchstone was whether the congressional re
gime provided "meaningful" protection for the constitutional right at
issue. If it did, then its strength compared to the judicially-devised
scheme was irrelevant.33
Similarly, in Smith v. Robbins, a case decided just a few months be
fore Dickerson, the Court held that its procedure for dealing with
frivolous appeals could be superseded by a California procedure.34 In
words that echo the cases interpreting Miranda, the Court said that
the procedure imposed on the states by Anders v. California35 was
simply a "prophylactic framework" and not "a constitutional com
mand." Accordingly, California could substitute an alternative proce28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 391-95 (1971); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1983) (discussing ap
plication of enforcement measures to the states).
30. The search and seizure exclusionary rule is different from Miranda's exclusionary
rule because it is a remedy for actual violations of the Fourth Amendment. Adopting an
analogous approach in the Fifth Amendment context would mean suppressing evidence only
in cases in which a defendant's constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination has
actually been violated. This is precisely the approach of § 3501.
31. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
32. Id. at 372-73, 377.
33. Id. at 368, 386-90; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (remedial
regime replacing judicially-devised one upheld because it contained "meaningful safe
guards" for the constitutional rights at issue even though it failed to provide as "complete
relief'' as a Bivens remedy).
34. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
35. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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<lure. The Robbins Court warned that "any view . . . that converted
[the Anders procedure] from a suggestion into a straitjacket would
contravene [our] established practice of allowing the States wide dis
cretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the [Constitution], to
experiment with solutions to difficult policy problems."36 The test for
whether the substitute California procedure was constitutional was
whether it provided the "minimum safeguards" to protect the constitu
tional right at issue.37
Under a constitutional common law approach, the Dickerson case
could have been resolved straightforwardly in a way that reconciled
Miranda with its progeny. Like the interim measures in Bivens and
Anders, the Court could have viewed the Miranda rules as an interim
"prophylactic framework" designed to safeguard Fifth Amendment
rights. This would j ustify Miranda, since the Court is free (as in Bivens
and Anders) to craft rules that assist in the enforcement of constitu
tional rights. At the same time, this view would fit precisely the lan
guage and rationale of post-Miranda exceptions cases
Tucker,
Quarles, Elstad, and the like - whieh were predicated on Miranda as
a "prophylactic" device. Indeed, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Bivens even used the phrase "prophylactic measures" to describe
the Bivens remedial device, the same phrase that the Court would
later use to describe the Miranda rules.38
Under this view of Miranda, Congress can replace the Miranda
rules provided it leaves in place "meaningful safeguards." Section 3501
meets this test. As explained more fully below, § 3501 fully protects
against the admission of compelled statements in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.39 Congress, of course, has no authority to modify the
content of constitutional rights either directly or under the guise of its
remedial powers.40 By the same token, it could not abrogate a judi
cially-devised protective measure necessary to the survival of a consti
tutional right. But that is very different from saying that Congress has
no authority to modify a ruling that "overprotects" a constitutional
right, as Miranda's automatic rule excluding all unwarned custodial
statements clearly does.41 Overprotection means protection beyond
what the Constitution requires. It is in precisely that area that Con-

36. Smith, 528 U.S. at 273.
37. Id. at 276.
38. E.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987).
39. See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text (discussing safeguards against coerced
confessions provided by § 3501 and other measures).
40: City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
41. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the
Fifth Amendment itself'); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) ("(T]he Miranda rule 'overprotects' the value at stake.").
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gress must be free to fashion or modify rules as it thinks wisest.42 In
deed, if Congress had no role in making independent judgments about
what the law should be once constitutional requirements are satisfied,
it is difficult to see that it would have any role at all. Rules required by
the Constitution and rules beyond those required by the Constitution
together exhaust the universe of rules. If the judicial branch is em
powered to establish for all time the latter as well as the former, then
there is nothing left for Congress to do.43
This line of argument was presented in my brief.44 Yet the majority
opinion does not explain why it preferred instead to repudiate, sub si
lencio, the rationale of Tucker, Quarles, Elstad. Nor does the Court
explain why it relies on ambiguous implications from dicta in Miranda
to trump specific discussions in the Court's later opinions explicating
Miranda. Instead, the Court's response was essentially to cloud the
distinction between constitutional requirements and nonconstitutional
protective measures. The Court carried out this strategy through a vir
tual army of seemingly refined phrases - "constitutionally rooted,"
"of constitutional dimension" and the like - to characterize
Miranda's status. But these characterizations do nothing to resolve,
and in fact seem designed to obscure, the fundamental incoherence of
the Court's position: admitting that confessions obtained in violation
of Miranda do not always amount to compelled self-incrimination, but
maintaining nonetheless that it is unconstitutional for Congress to
permit the admission of such statements even if they have been shown
to be voluntary under conventional Fifth Amendment principles.45
42. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 284 ("We address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only
what is constitutionally compelled.") (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38
(1984)); cf. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.1 1 (1959).
43. Professor Strauss's interesting article in this Symposium takes the view that Miranda
should be viewed as part and parcel of ordinary constitutional jurisprudence, akin to the in
terpretation of the First Amendment rights found in, for example, New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Strauss, supra note 16, at 960-66. On this view, Strauss ar
gues, the Court properly struck down § 3501 because it was not "as good or better" than the
constitutional Miranda rules. Id. at 969-70. The difficulty with this argument from analogy,
however, is that it requires a justification for analogizing Miranda to the "constitutional"
interpretation exemplified by Sullivan rather than to the "prophylactic" interpretation ex
emplified by Bivens. If I read him correctly, Strauss fails to offer any explanation for viewing
Miranda as akin to Sullivan rather than to Bivens. As I have tried to argue here, the case for
the Bivens analogy is strong. Unlike the Sullivan analogy, a Bivens analogy fits both the ter
minology of Miranda doctrine (e.g., "prophylactic rule") and its practical effects ("overpro
tection" of the right, replacement by Congress, etc.). Of course, if the Bivens analogy is cor
rect, Congress was free to replace the Miranda rule not with a rule that was, in Strauss's
terms, "as good or better" than Miranda, but rather with one that satisfied the constitutional
minimum. See supra notes 32 - 33.
44. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the Judgment
Below at 4-28, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525). This
document, and many others related to the Dickerson case, are available on my website at
www.law.utah.edu/cassell [hereinafter Cassell website].
45. Professor Schulhofer's provocative contribution to this Symposium argues that all of
the Justices in Dickerson share some misconception that Fifth Amendment rights during cus-
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Dickerson implicitly assumes that, in order to provide an addi
tional shield for the exercise of a constitutional right, the Court has the
authority to invalidate an act of Congress even if that act alone ade
quately protects against actual violations of that right. That, however,
is precisely the authority the Court refused to exercise in Bush and
Chi/icky. In those cases, the Court found that Congress was in a better
todial police questioning are somehow distinct from "ordinary" Fifth Amendment rights. See
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941 (2001). The cases Schulhofer cites for the
"ordinary" principle, however, illustrate only the special point that imposing a penalty on a
person for exercising the Fifth Amendment is constitutionally forbidden. See Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (criminal contempt); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614 (1965) ("[C]omment on the refusal to testify . . . is a penalty imposed by courts for exer
cising a constitutional privilege."); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (penalty of
loss of public employment); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968) (the "privi
lege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt . . . to coerce a waiver . . . on
penalty of the loss of employment"); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972) (striking
down rule because it "imposed a penalty for petitioner's initial silence"); Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973) (viewing disqualification from public contracting as an imper
missible "penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege" (internal quotation omitted));
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-06 (1977) ("[G]overnment cannot penalize as
sertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination by imposing sanc
tions."); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1979) (explaining that the rule consid
ered in Brooks v. Tennessee was found unconstitutional because it "imposed a penalty on the
right to remain silent"); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981) (explaining that no ad
verse-inference instruction must be given to jury because "the penalty" for not testifying
"may be just as severe [as in Griffin] when . . . the jury is left to roam at large with only its
untutored instincts to guide it . . . "). Since Schulhofer's cases reflect only a prohibition of
penalizing the exercise of the privilege of silence, they provide no rational support for
Schulhofer's notion that merely questioning a suspect in custody automatically violates the
Fifth Amendment unless an elaborate set of protective procedures is followed. See generally
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 137-39 & n.151 (1996).
Schulhofer further argues that Fifth Amendment exceptionalism is of recent origin, at
tributable purely to the Tucker-Elstad-Quarles lines of cases which "drain[ed] Fifth
Amendment compulsion of its distinctive content" by equating it with Fourteenth Amend
ment voluntariness. See Schulhofer, supra, at 949-50. But Court precedent before Miranda
specifically recognized the congruence of the voluntariness standard and the self
incrimination standard in the specific context of custodial questioning. See Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (stating that voluntariness standard and Fifth Amendment stan
dard for admission of confessions are "the same standard"). Schulhofer also claims that the
fact that Fifth Amendment precedent condemns certain practices as "impermissibly compel
ling per se" demonstrates that the voluntariness standard is "entirely foreign to the Court's
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence . . . " Schulhofer, supra, at 947-48. But per se prohibitions
were recognized under the voluntariness standard as well. See, e.g. , Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (holding that where suspect is threatened with violence, there "is no
need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the individual," because such confessions
are "too untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt"). It is therefore unsurprising to
find the Court's cases routinely treating compulsion under the Fifth Amendment and invol
untariness as the same standard in substance. See Portash, 440 U.S. at 458-59 (treating com
pulsion in the Fifth Amendment sense as an interchangeable concept with coercion and in
voluntariness); Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495-98 (same).
Of course, as a final problem, Schulhofer's position would require repudiating numerous
post-Miranda cases, such as Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad. Small wonder, then, that, although
he advanced this position to the Court in Dickerson, see Brief for Amicus Curiae The
American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at 7-11 , Dickerson v. United States,
120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (authored in part by Schulhofer), not a single Justice
even nibbled on it. At least I got two votes!
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position than the courts to evaluate the costs and benefits of differing
approaches,46 and that the Court had "no legal basis that would allow
[it] to revise [Congress's] decisions."47 The same is true with custodial
questioning. It is not possible through any feasible set of rules to as
sure that interrogations never become coercive. The only way to fore
close that possibility completely is to prohibit custodial questioning al
together, just as the only way to prevent any violations of defendants'
rights at trial would be to prohibit all prosecutions. The Miranda
Court declined to impose this prohibition, and with good reason.
Because perfection is impossible, estimating the effectiveness of
laws intended to decrease the number of constitutional violations, how
many there are to be decreased, and the cost to other values that one
preventive rule or another is likely to impose, are necessarily matters
of judgment and degree. "Congressional competence at 'balancing
governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals],' . . . is no more
questionable" in the context of custodial interrogations than in other
settings.48 Accordingly, there was no sounder basis for disturbing Con
gress's judgment as to what measures are best designed to effectuate
that balance fairly in this instance than there was in Bush or Chilicky.
To the extent that Dickerson answers any of these concerns, it is
through two, very briefly developed arguments that are misplaced as
an answer to the constitutional common law approach. First, the Court
notes that, "with respect to proceedings in state courts, our 'authority
is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States
Constitution.' "49 Of course, if the Court can "enforce" constitutional
commands with nonconstitutional prophylactic rules, as cases like
Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad squarely held, then this statement pro
vides no basis for concluding that the Miranda rules are constitution
ally required. Moreover, the proposition that the Court has some
authority to impose on the States measures that are not strictly consti
tutionally necessary, but are designed to assist in enforcing constitu
tional rights, is hardly revolutionary. It is consistent with what the
Miranda Court itself said on the subject. Whatever else is in dispute
about the Miranda decision, it is clear that the Court believed its spe
cific rule could be legislatively superceded by others. Nor is Miranda
the only instance in which the Court has claimed this power. The
Court has engaged in a similar task in several other areas.5° For exam·

46. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1 983).
47. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988).
48. Chi/icky, 487 U.S. at 425 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389) (internal citation omitted);
see also Palermo, 360 U.S. at 343, 353 n.11 (discovery rules for criminal defendants).
49. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)).
50. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (discussing Mapp, Bivens, and similar
cases).
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ple, the Court has applied the act of state doctrine to the states as a
judicially created, nonconstitutional rule that is not compelled by the
Constitutions1 and subject to congressional modification.s2 Similarly,
under the dormant commerce clause doctrine, Congress is free to vali
date state actions that would otherwise be prohibited by the Court's
decisions.s3
Yet another example of the Court applying extraconstitutional
rules to the states was discussed during oral argument in Dickerson,
but did not find its way into the Court's opinion. The rule of
Chapman v. California,s4 is a clear counter-example to Dickerson's
claim that rules applied to the states may not be superseded legisla
tively by Congress.ss Chapman involved a state constitution provision
which established a standard for deciding reversible versus harmless
error.s6 The Court held that federal law overrode the state standard,
but was unclear about the basis for the rule it announced.s7 It is clear,
however, that the Chapman standard is not mandated by the
Constitution.s8 Indeed, as the Chapman opinion itself states, the re
sponsibility, and presumably the authority, of the Court to fashion
such a rule exists only "in the absence of appropriate congressional ac
tion. "s9 A court-made rule, like that in Chapman, that overrides a state
constitutional provision yet is subject to revision by Congress, can only
be explained as federal common law.60
Justice Scalia pursued this issue at oral argument, explaining to
Solicitor General Waxman that: "In Chapman v. California, which was
decided the term after Miranda and which also involved a procedural
51. See e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
52. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de
nied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). For further discussion of the act of state analogy to Miranda, see
Cassell, supra note 1, at 238-39.
53. The doctrine furthers the constitutional "right to engage in interstate trade," Dennis
v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) (internal quotations omitted), by invalidating state laws
that unduly burden or interfere with such commerce. The Court's decisions in this area are
certainly "constitutionally based" on the Commerce Clause, but Congress is free to modify
them. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1985);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 436 (1856).
54. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
55. The following discussion draws heavily on the amicus brief from the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation, which presented this argument to the Court. See Brief of Amicus Crimi
nal Justice Legal Foundation, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 995525).
56. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20 & n.3.
57. See Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 2, 24-26 (1994).
58. 386 U.S. at 24-26.
59. 386 U.S. at 21.
60. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 26 ("[T]he harmless error rule should be seen as constitu
tional common law.").
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rule, we said: 'We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these
petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth Amendment
right is a Federal right which, in the absence of appropriate congres
sional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the neces
sary rule.' "61 This statement demonstrates the Justices' awareness of
the statement in Chapman about fashioning a constitutional rule, ap
plicable to the states, that is nonetheless subject to congressional
modification. Yet the Dickerson majority choose not to explain why it
would not view Miranda, decided just one year before Chapman, in
the same way.
The only oth,er explanation the Court gave for concluding that
Miranda was a constitutionally based rule was Miranda's application
in habeas proceedings. In a footnote, the Court recounted the federal
habeas statute, which makes relief available for claims that a person
"is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the
United States."62 The Court then asserted, in a single sentence, that
" [s]ince the Miranda rule is clearly not based on federal law or trea
ties, our decision allowing habeas review for Miranda claims obviously
assumes that Miranda is of constitutional origin."63 The truth is that
nothing could be less clear or obvious. The Court had never said any
such thing in the prior habeas cases. Moreover, another straightfor
ward inference was possible to explain Miranda's application on ha
beas. Miranda could be viewed as part of the "law of the United
States," which, for purposes of § 2254(a), includes not only federal
statutes, but also decisional law designed to help effectuate the federal
Constitution or statutes. The Court had taken a similar view of the
same phrase used in a similar context in the federal question jurisdic
tional statute64 and had attached such a construction to the words
"laws of the several States" to include state court decisions in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.65 This is the approach of not only Larry
Yackle, a leading habeas commentator,66 but of the Department of
Justice. In the 1993 case Withrow v. Williams,67 when a Miranda issue
61. Tr. of Oral Argument at 14, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No.
99-5525) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (emphasis added)).
62. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).
63. 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3 (emphases added).
64. See Nat'I Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
850-51 (1985) (providing that federal common law as articulated in rules that are fashioned
by court decisions constitutes "laws" as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
65. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
66. See LARRY w. YACKLE, POST CONVICTION REMEDIES § 97, at 371 (1981 & 1996
Supp.) (concluding Miranda rules can be viewed as "federal 'law' which, under the [habeas]
statute, may form the basis for habeas relief').
67. See Tr. Of Oral Argument at 15-16, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No.
91-1030). While the transcript of oral argument does not identify the justices who are
speaking, I have listened to the tape and believe the justice is Justice Stevens.
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was before the Court on habeas, the Deputy Solicitor General told the
Court that Miranda could indeed be viewed as a "law" of the United
States under the habeas statute.68 In Dickerson, however, the
Department of Justice simply reversed its position,69 without even ac
knowledging (much less explaining) the about face.70 Interestingly,
during the oral argument in Withrow, at least one Justice appeared to
agree with this position, going so far as to concur with the idea of con
stitutional common law:
QUESTION: Do you think that the exclusionary rule is a "law" of the
United States that was involved in Stone?
MR. ROBERTS: I think it is what's been described as constitutional
common law.
QUESTION: Yeah, I think so, too.71

As this colloquy illustrates, the answers to such questions are, at a
minimum, far from "clear" and "obvious."
* * * * *

In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was
this: In considering § 3501, Congress balanced the costs and benefits of
a rule excluding all unwarned confessions against the costs and bene
fits of allowing the trial court to decide on the facts of each case
whether the suspect spoke voluntarily. It knew the obvious, namely,
that a court is distinctly less likely to find an unwarned statement to
have been voluntary, but that sometimes the court would decide that
other circumstances proved the statement's voluntary character. It
also knew that there would be some cases where allowing the jury to
hear that statement would prove the difference between a successful
and unsuccessful prosecution of a dangerous criminal. Finally, it un
derstood the damage to public confidence in the criminal justice sys
tem, not to mention the risk to public safety, that results when the jury
reaches the wrong result because it is not allowed to hear highly pro
bative evidence. Weighing all these considerations, Congress con
cluded that the cost of slightly less police deterrence - that is, mar
ginally diminished deterrence resulting from the significant risk (as
opposed to the certainty) of excluding an unwarned confession - was
68. Tr. of Oral Argument at 14-15, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No. 911030).
69. See Brief of the United States at 24, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) (No. 99-5525).
70. Curiously, in Withrow, the prisoner was represented by Seth Waxman. When Mr.
Waxman became Solicitor General, he apparently directed the Department to reverse, with
out explanation, its earlier position.
71. Tr. of Oral Argument at 18, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (No. 91-1030)
(quotation marks inserted around "law").
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outweighed by the benefits of admitting such a confession, so long as it
is voluntary. Because Congress's modification of Miranda's extracon
stitutional and overprotective exclusionary rule continues to forbid in
all instances the government's use of involuntary statements, it fully
affords defendants their rights under the Fifth Amendment, and thus
is constitutionally sound.
II. THEPATHNOT TAKEN: § 3501 ASAN A DEQUATE A LTERNATIVE
TO MIRANDA
The second way Dickerson could have been resolved hinges on the
issue of alternatives to Miranda. The Miranda Court itself invited indeed "encouraged" - Congress and the states to craft alternative
approaches to the Miranda rules.72 The Miranda Court promised that
"[ o]ur decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform."73 This was one reason that
Congress in 1968 chose to adopt § 3501.74
Section 3501 creates far stronger incentives for police officers to
deliver Miranda-type warnings than existed before 1966. The press
and academic commentators have written about Dickerson as though
the issue were the "overruling" of Miranda or "the end of Miranda
warnings." By doing so, they overlook an important and obvious fea
ture of § 3501, namely that all of the Miranda warnings remain part of
the voluntariness determination. The truth is that the warnings them
selves were never at stake in Dickerson.
Police officers would have generally continued to give Miranda
warnings if the Fourth Circuit had been affirmed and if § 3501 had
been upheld. Section 3501 directs the courts to consider the following
when making voluntariness determinations:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confes
sion, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of
the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and be
fore arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the of
fense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time
of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised
or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any
such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such de
fendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assis
tance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.75

72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
73. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
74. See S.REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112.
75. 18 u.s.c. § 3501(b) (1994).
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The prominence that Miranda warnings enjoyed under § 3501 means
that, if the Court had upheld the statute, federal law enforcement offi
cers would almost certainly have continued to give them. They would
have done so because it would assist in obtaining a favorable ruling on
the admissibility of a statement a trial.76
This was not merely my view. The Department of Justice specifi
cally stated in its brief in Dickerson that federal agents would continue
to deliver Miranda warnings.77 Indeed, it is a little discussed fact that
federal agents gave Miranda warnings even before they were required
to do so by the Miranda opinion.78 Their doing so provides a real
world confirmation of the Fourth Circuit's view that "nothing [in §
3501] provides those in law enforcement with an incentive to stop
giving the now familiar Miranda warnings."79
Section 350l's encouragement to agents to give Miranda warnings
might alone have been viewed as creating a viable alternative to
Miranda.80 But § 3501 cannot be assessed in splendid isolation.81 Since
1966, Congress and the courts have greatly expanded the civil, crimi
nal, and administrative penalties against federal officers who coerce
suspects. For example, in 1966, it was as a practical matter impossible
for a suspect to sue a federal officer who coerced a confession. That
changed in 1971, with Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, which recog
nized a federal civil rights suit against individual federal agents for
violations of constitutional rights.82 Bolstering the Bivens suits against
individual agents, Congress in 1974 passed amendments to the Federal
Tort Claims Act. These amendments waived sovereign immunity for
suits against the federal government arising out of acts or omissions by
76. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (noting that Mirandized
statements rarely found involuntary), quoted with approval in Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336;
see also Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2001) (noting that a survey of cases suggests that successful chal
lenges to Mirandized confessions are rare).
77. See Brief of Amicus Dep't of Justice, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) (No. 99-5525).
78. See infra note 174 (discussing FBI practice). United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 66
(4th Cir. 1999).
79. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 66 (4th Cir. 1999).
80. Section 3501 also extended additional protections to suspects in at least one other
way. See Cassell, supra note 1, at 243 (noting § 3501's requirement that courts consider the
suspect's awareness of the nature of the charges against him, a requirement that extends fur
ther than Miranda doctrine found in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987)).
81. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L REV. 1479, 1483-1538 (1987) (courts should consider entire legal landscape in construing
statutes).
Several critiques of the constitutionality of § 3501 appear to suffer from the problem of
analyzing the statute alone without considering the supplemental devices bolstering § 3501.
See, e.g., Kamisar, Congress, supra note 13 (discussing only § 3501); Klein, supra note 7, at
1057; Strauss, supra note 16, at 969.
82. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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federal law enforcement agents involving "assault, battery, false im
prisonment, abuse of process" and the like.83 In addition to civil suits,
the federal government now has in place a much more developed sys
tem of criminal and administrative penalties against its officers who
coerce suspects into confession. For example, the Civil Rights D ivision
of the Department of Justice now routinely investigates allegations of
police brutality during interrogation.84
My amicus brief advanced this position, explaining why it provided
greater protection against truly coerced confessions than the Miranda
framework.85 The Court responded to this issue in five sentences. The
five sentences (with numbers inserted for ease of reference) are:
[1] We agree with the amicus' contention that there are more remedies
available for abusive police conduct than there were at the time Miranda
was decided (citing cases). [2] But we do not agree that these additional
measures supplement section 3501 's protections sufficiently to meet the
constitutional minimum. [3] Miranda requires procedures that will warn
a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the
suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. [4] As discussed
above, section 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation
warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a sus
pect's confessions. [5] The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in
our view, render them, together with section 3501, an adequate substitute
for the warnings required by Miranda.86

These five sentences exemplify the "nine headed Caesar" that Justice
Scalia decried. The first sentence describes the position I advanced.
The second sentence says that my position was rejected. The third and
fourth sentences briefly describe Miranda and § 3501, and the fifth
sentence repeats the conclusion that my argument is rejected - that
Caesar has given a "thumbs down" to my position. But why the
thumbs down? The Court, after all, had relied on similar remedies in
refusing to extend the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to immi
gration proceedings in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.87 Yet here the Court
offers no explanation for refusing to find the alternative remedies
adequate.
An interesting omission from this part of the opinion is any refer
ence to Miranda's requirement that any alternative be shown to be "at
83. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1994).
84. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.50 (1994) (establishing Justice Department's Civil Rights Division).
85. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus at 28-40, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.
Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). Other commentators have also raised this issue. See, e.g.,
Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1 149, 1184-87, 1203-04 (1998).
86. 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
87. 468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45 (1984).
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least as effective [as Miranda] in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it."88 Perhaps the Dickerson Court omitted it because, as a matter of
precedent, the "equally effective" language obviously is not necessary
to Miranda's holding.89 Moreover, the language could not be recon
ciled with the Court's later descriptions of Miranda. Miranda's various
statements about the need for equally effective alternatives all occur
in those parts of the opinion where the Court seems to say that any
statement police obtain without explaining to the defendant his rights
is necessarily compelled. But as noted earlier,w cases such as Quarles
make clear that those portions of Miranda cannot be read that way. In
Quarles and similar cases, suspects' statements were found admissible
despite having been obtained without either compliance with Miranda
or any "equally effective" alternative. Once those portions of Miranda
are properly understood, the force of the "equally effective" dicta dis
appears. The Court can insist on warnings or their equivalents only if
the admission of a statement obtained without these measures would
violate the Constitution. Dickerson, as Justice Scalia pointed out,
makes no such assertion.91 Nor could any such assertion be reconciled
with Quarles and related cases. The surviving justification for a
"warnings or equivalent" requirement is instead to help prevent future
Fifth Amendment violations. This is the way that Dickerson describes
Miranda. Dickerson explains that the old voluntariness test "raised a
risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a risk that the
Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the
case in chief to prove guilt."92 In briefly mentioning the "equally effec
tive" language in an earlier part of the opinion, the Court "clarified"
that it means a "procedure that is effective in securing Fifth
Amendment rights."93 If this is true, however, other prophylactic
measures that provide equivalent protection against the use of actually
compelled statements are constitutionally sufficient even if they do not
provide equivalent assurance that the suspect was informed of his
rights so long as they sufficiently reduce the "risk" of a violation and

88. Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
89. Cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) ("Some comments in the Miranda
opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and can
not be regarded as controlling.").
90. See supra notes 1 1-13 and accompanying text.
91. 120 S. Ct. at 2337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
93. 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.6 (emphasis added).
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"secure" the underlying Fifth Amendment right to be free from giving
an involuntary statement.94
* * * * *

In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was
this: Miranda itself invited Congress and the states to adopt reason
able alternative procedures for protecting suspects during custodial in
terrogation. Section 3501, when considered against the backdrop of
other statutory and judiciary protections against police coercion, pro
vides sufficient protection to comply with the Constitution.
III.

SECTION 3501 AS A MODIFICATION OF MIRANDA 'S
I RREBUTIABLE PRESUMPTION

So far, this Article has focused on unresolved inconsistencies be
tween Dickerson and the rest of Miranda doctrine. But Dickerson's
doctrinal problems extend into other areas as well. Perhaps the most
glaring deficiency is the latitude that the Court has given itself in
promulgating constitutional "rules" as opposed to the constraints it
has imposed on Congress, an ostensibly co-equal branch of govern
ment. In particular, in its landmark 1997 decision, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 95 the Court demarcated clear limits on the power of Congress
to promulgate prophylactic rules protecting constitutional rights. Yet
in Dickerson, the Court refused to abide by the same rules.
Here it useful to recall the developments leading up to the Boerne
decision.96 The Supreme Court had decided in Employment Division v.
Smith97 that government decisions burdening religious practices need
only survive a rational basis test, not the more demanding compelling
interest test. Under rational basis scrutiny, the Court upheld Oregon's
law prohibiting the use of peyote in Native American religious cere
monies. Congress then held extensive hearings on the subject, con
cluding that the rational basis test inadequately protected First
Amendment free exercise rights. At the behest of Senators Orrin
94. Cf Smith v. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2000) (upholding against constitutional
challenge an alternative to Anders procedure that provided protection for constitutional
right at issue at least as good as contained in Anders). Bolstering this point is the
congressional judgment that § 3501 would effectively secure suspects' rights, a point pursued
at greater length in Part III, infra. Cf Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 ( 1 983); Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1987) (deferring to congressional judgments on effectiveness issues).
Also, during the sixteen months § 3501 was in effect in the Fourth Circuit, it appeared that,
in practice, § 3501 has indeed been at least as effective as the Miranda regime at protecting
Fifth Amendment rights.
95. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
96. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom
and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995).
97. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Hatch and Ted Kennedy, among others, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") requiring all state and
federal laws burdening religion to satisfy the compelling interest test.
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as un
constitutional. The Court concluded that, even though Congress has
the power to "enforce" constitutional rights under Section 5 of the
14th Amendment, Congress lacked the power to mandate the compel
ling interest test across the states for all laws. The Court was con
cerned that Congress might use its "enforcement" power effectively to
rewrite the Constitution. To prevent such rewriting under the guise of
remediation, the Court required that there be "congruence and pro
portionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end." RFRA, the Court concluded, could not
survive that test because it effectively changed the First Amendment
standard, dictating a new constitutional rule that states were required
to follow.98
With those limits on Congress in mind, it may be useful to employ
a thought experiment to see how the Boerne limitations might apply in
the Miranda context. Imagine for a moment that the Supreme Court
had never adopted the Miranda procedures. Congress, however, de
cided to step in and require those procedures. Assume that Congress
passed a federal statute requiring state police officers to recite the
Miranda warnings and - this is the most important part - mandated
that state courts could not admit into evidence any confession ob
tained without these warnings. Under City of Boerne, such a sweeping
enactment would be beyond the powers of Congress. The enactment
would effectively "rewrite" the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of in
voluntary statements and require a vast reworking of state police op
erations around the country. The enactment would make "a substan
tive change in constitutional protections."99 It is hard to see how such a
change would be a "congruent and proportionate"100 enforcement de
vice for protecting Fifth Amendment rights.
The obvious application of this exercise is to consider how
Boerne's limitations on Congress would apply to the Court's decision
in Miranda. Miranda goes beyond the Fifth Amendment in requiring
the suppression of voluntary but unwarned confessions, like the con
fession given by Dickerson. Miranda's rules are out of proportion be
cause they "prohibit . . . substantially more" police practices than
would "likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable" Fifth
Amendment standard.101 To be sure, confessions obtained without
98. For trenchant criticism of Boerne, see Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v . Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
99. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
100. Id. at 520. See Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644-50 (2000).
101. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647.
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complying with Miranda's procedures may sometimes be involuntary.
But there is little reason to believe that this will be true all the time or
even most of the time. As Justice O'Connor observed a few years be
fore Dickerson:
In case after case, the courts are asked . . . to decide purely technical

Miranda questions that contain not even a hint of police overreaching.
And in case after case, no voluntariness issue is raised, primarily because
none exists. Whether the suspect was in "custody, " whether or not there
was "interrogation," whether warnings were given or were adequate,
whether the defendant's equivocal statement constituted an invocation of
rights, whether waiver was knowing and intelligent - this is the stuff that
Miranda claims are made of. While these questions create litigable issues
under Miranda, they generally do not indicate the existence of coer
cion . . . sufficient to establish involuntariness.102

In Dickerson, for example, the district court found Dickerson's un
warned statements voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. The volun
tariness of the statements in this case is typical of Miranda violations
that have reached the Court over the years.103
Miranda's lack of proportionality is shown not only by its over
broad reach in particular cases, but also by its unlimited application.
Miranda's automatic exclusionary rule applies to every episode of cus
todial questioning conducted by every level of government, federal,
state, and local, numbering in the hundreds of thousands each year. It
is not limited to a particular period of time or to jurisdictions with a
particular history of abuse. It contains no mechanism for a jurisdiction
to extricate itself by showing that it has had a long history of compli
ance with the Self-Incrimination Clause.104 The "indiscriminate scope"
of the rules is itself strong evidence that they are disproportionate.105
The Court has also looked to the scope of the problem Congress is
addressing when considering the breadth of prophylactic rules. The
scope of the problem to which Miranda was responding remains un
clear, but the evidence of epidemic police abuse was, and is, quite lim
ited. Miranda did refer to "anecdotal evidence" concerning abusive

102. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 709-10 (1 993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (cita
tions omitted) (collecting numerous illustrations).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 986 n.2 (D.C. 1991) (statement spe
cifically found to be voluntary below), cert. granted, 504 U.S. 908 (1992) (No. 91-1521) and
cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545 (1993); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 315 (1985) ("It is . . . be
yond dispute that respondent's earlier [un-Miran diz ed] remark was voluntary."); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) ("There is no evidence or suggestion that Hass' statements to
[police] . . . were involuntary or coerced."); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974)
("the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against
compulsory self-incrimination").
104. Cf Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (commenting favorably on the presence of such devices
as a means of assuring proportionality).
105. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650.
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police interrogation,106 which no doubt was a problem in exceptional
cases before Miranda
just as it remains a problem in some excep
tional cases today. B ut the bulk of the j ustification in the opinion came
from an examination of "police manuals and texts" on techniques for
questioning suspects.107 The difficulties with this material as evidence
of pervasive coercion in custodial interrogations are legion.108 In fact,
the Miranda majority acknowledged that it had little idea about typi
cal practices.109 Moreover, while the tactics in the police manuals were
offered as evidence of compulsion, the Miranda Court concluded only
that the tactics created the "potentiality for compulsion."110 Thus, the
opinion in effect admits its failure to demonstrate that the techniques
and circumstances it characterized as giving rise to potential compul
sion pervasively resulted in actual compulsion.111 Nor is that particu
larly surprising, for it is clear that the Miranda Court's true concern
was with the potentially coercive circumstances themselves, not with
actual compulsion - j ust as it is clear that, in passing RFRA, " [the
103d] Congress's concern was with the incidental burdens imposed"
on religion by neutral laws, not with deliberate persecution.112
Dickerson rests on an understanding of the Court's power that ex
tends it far beyond Congress's. The Court is entitled, of course, to the
last word in interpreting the Constitution in the Marbury v. Madison
sense. But questions of "constitutional rules" are of a different order.
As Justice Scalia's dissent pointedly notes, Dickerson in no way
equates a violation of Miranda's "constitutional rule" with a violation
-

106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966). Interestingly, Miranda did not
cite any contemporary cases in which the police had extracted a confession through threat
ened force. For this point, it relied on such dated information as the Wickersham Report in
1931 and a few Supreme Court cases in the 1940s and early 1950s. 384 U.S. at 445-46.
Miranda went on to conclude that police coercion "is not, unfortunately, relegated to the
past or to any part of the country," id. at 446, resting this assertion on a few additional iso
lated and dated reports. Id. The Court conceded, however, that "[t]he examples given above
are undoubtedly the exception now." Id. at 447.
107. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
108. See generally id. at 532-33 (White, J., dissenting).
1 09. Id. at 448.
1 10. Id. at 457.
1 1 1. Id. at 645. It is also noteworthy that both the executive and legislative branches
reached their own conclusions, contemporaneously with Miranda, that coercion as tradition
ally understood was not pervasive in custodial interrogations. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 93 (1967) (stating, based on pre-Miranda data, that "today the third degree is al
most nonexistent"); S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 21 12, 2134
(reviewing congressional testimony from expert witnesses on lack of coercive techniques and
concluding Miranda's contrary findings were based on an "overreact(ion] to defense claims
that police brutality is widespread"); see generally Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs:
An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 473-78 (1996) (hereinafter Cassell, So
cial Costs] (collecting evidence on limited number of involuntary confessions in 1966).
1 12. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
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of the Constitution.11 3 Instead, Dickerson describes Miranda as reject
ing the old, totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness test because it
"raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, a
risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is
offered in the case in chief to prove guilt."114 B ut this, of course, was
precisely the type of protection Congress sought to extend to First
Amendment freedoms in City of Boerne.115 In refusing to apply a
Boerne analysis to its own rule, the Court is asserting greater authority
to craft such protective devices than Congress possesses. Yet, if any
thing, congressional power in this area should be broader than judicial
power. The Constitution explicitly confers on Congress the power to
"enforce" constitutional rights in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
and the power to adopt "necessary and proper" legislation in Article I,
Section 8. In contrast, any power that the Constitution confers on the
Court to enforce rights is purely an inferential one, presumably no
greater than the power possessed by Congress, and perhaps even
lesser. 116
Dickerson's rigid adherence to rules that lack congruence and pro
portionality is particularly suspect in light of a modest modification
that was proposed in Dickerson. The lack of congruence and propor
tionality between Miranda's rules and Fifth Amendment violations
could have been cured by changing Miranda's irrebuttable presump
tion to a rebuttable one. Under Miranda doctrine, the "[f]ailure to
administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion"
which is "irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in
chief."117 In other contexts, such rigid presumptions are typically justi
fied on the ground that they "avoid the costs of excessive inquiry
where a per se rule will achieve the correct result in almost all
cases."118 The Miranda presumption, however, operates to achieve in
correct results in many cases.
1 13. 120 S. Ct. at 3227 (Scalia, J . , dissenting); see also discussion at supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
1 14. 120 S. Ct. at 2335 (internal citation omitted).
115. See S. Rep. No. 1 03-1 1 1 , at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897
("By lowering the level of constitutional protection for religious practices, [Smith] has cre
ated a climate in which the free exercise of religion is jeopardized.").
1 16. Compare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1966) (upholding congres
sional ban on literacy tests), with Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S.
45, 51-54 (1 959) (refusing to strike down literacy tests under Court's authority to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause).
1 1 7. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
1 1 8. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991). Per se rules are also sometimes
justified on the grounds that exceptions are not sufficiently "important to justify the time
and expense necessary to identify them." Id. (internal citation omitted). This rationale has
no application when considering § 3501. Congress has determined to the contrary that the
judiciary should devote such additional energy as may be needed (if any) to making accurate
(rather than presumptive) voluntariness determinations in federal criminal cases. Moreover,
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The Court has acknowledged that " [p]er se rules should not be ap
plied . . . in situations where the generalization is incorrect as an em
pirical matter; the justification for a conclusive presumption disap
pears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct
result most of the time."119 Under Boerne, the irrebuttable presump
tion creates a jarring lack of "congruence and proportionality." In
deed, to apply an irrebuttable presumption is effectively to change the
Fifth Amendment's compulsion standard to a new, warnings-and
waiver standard, thus "alter[ing] the meaning" of the Fifth
Amendment120 and "substantively redefin[ing] the State's legal obliga
tions" during custodial interrogation.121
The simple way to avoid flagrant inconsistency with the Boerne
principle would have been for the Court to have modified Miranda so
that it operated as a rebuttable presumption - that is, confessions
taken without following the Miranda procedures would have been
presumed involuntary unless the state could prove otherwise. Justice
Clark suggested this approach in his dissent in Miranda as an interme
diate position between the majority and the other dissenters. He pro
posed that " [i]n the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the
State to prove . . . that in the totality of the circumstances, including
the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly
voluntary."122
This allocation of burdens, superimposed on § 3501 (which can
easily be read in this fashion123), would have brought § 350l's prophy
lactic effect even closer to that of Miranda's exclusionary rule by ex
plicitly conferring a preferred status to confessions obtained in com
pliance with Miranda. At the same time, it would have eliminated the
single feature of Miranda's irrebuttable presumption most objection
able under Boerne: the imposition of a standard for the admissibility
of custodial confessions more stringent than the constitutional volun
tariness standard, and the attendant automatic exclusion of many
statements that in fact comply with the constitutional standard. In conbecause confessions are "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and
punishing those who violate the law," Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986), individu
alized voluntariness determinations would appear to be time well spent.
1 1 9. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 737.
120. Cf Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.").
121. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000). See generally ]. GRANO,
supra note 45, at 198 (arguing that Miranda "substituted for the constitutional rule a new
substantive rule of its own making").
·

122. 384 U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting).
.
1 23. Section 3501(a) provides that a confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given" (emphasis added), implying that the presumption is against admissibility
unless and until voluntariness is established. The Court, of course, has a duty to read con
gressional enactments so as to comply with the Constitution.
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trast, a rebuttable presumption would have been a proportionate re
sponse to the various risks identified by the Miranda Court. It would
also have preserved the assistance the Miranda factors provide to the
courts in structuring the voluntariness inquiry, while ending the irra
tional mechanical application of those factors to exclude unwarned
confessions, even when the confession is unquestionably voluntary.
In Illinois v. Gates,124 the Court performed a similar modification to
a test it previously suggested but came to regard as overly rigid. In
Gates, the Court rejected the two-pronged "Spinelli-Aguilar" test for
determining probable cause in favor of a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach. Raising a concern that applies equally to the Miranda doc
trine, the Court explained that "the 'two-pronged test' has encouraged
an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with undue at
tention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be di
vorced from the other facts."125 Yet, in restoring the totality-of-the
circumstances approach, the Court emphasized that the Spinelli
Aguilar factors remained "highly relevant" in determining probable
cause,126 and later cases have examined them.127 Thus, just as the
Spinelli-Aguilar factors now serve "not as inflexible, independent re
quirements applicable in every case," but rather as "guides to a magis
trate's determination of probable cause,"128 so too the Miranda factors
would have guided determination of voluntariness issues.
Making the Miranda presumption rebuttable would not have re
turned the law to its pre-Miranda state. When Miranda was decided,
the constitutional assignment of the burden for establishing voluntari
ness was unclear.129 A rebuttable Miranda presumption could have
been crafted that would place the burden on the government to estab
lish voluntariness while making delivery of Miranda warnings an im
portant part of the calculus.
The Dickerson majority's response to this possibility was aston
ishing. The idea of viewing Miranda as a rebuttable presumption was
presented to the Court not only in my brief on behalf of the Fourth
124. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
125. Id. at 234-35 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 230.
127. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
128. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 n.6.
129. See Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1 069-70
(1966) (noting majority rule that prosecution proves voluntariness and minority rule that
defendant proves involuntariness). After Miranda, the issue has been clarified, but has not
been definitively resolved. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), definitely suggests that
the prosecution must prove voluntariness. See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.3(c) at 429 (2d ed. 1999) (noting Lego "raises serious doubts"
about placing burden on defendant to prove involuntariness). But some states continue to
place the burden on the defendant to show involuntariness. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 742
So.2d 466, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

March 2001]

Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson

923

Circuit, but was also suggested in separate briefs filed by the United
States House of Representatives, by a number of United States
Senators, and nineteen states.130 The majority said only - in a single
sentence in a concluding footnote - that it would not consider the
various suggestions that had been advanced by the various amici be
cause of "the procedural posture of this case."131 The Court's reason
ing here is quite strained. In its concluding footnote, the Court cites
three cases standing for the proposition that the Court generally will
not reach arguments that have not "been urged by either party in this
Court."132 But, in Dickerson, both of the parties were attacking the de
cision below - the very reason that various amici organizations were
compelled to file briefs defending the decision. In those circumstances,
refusing to consider the amici's arguments because they were not pre
sented by the parties effectively allowed a stipulated outcome, the
very thing that the Court has long held impermissible.133 With a case in
this posture, it also meant that the Court departed from the normal
rule that respondents (in this case, amicus respondents) could raise
any argument in support of the judgment below.134 Instead, on the
Court's view, only the Fourth Circuit's arguments could be considered
as a basis for sustaining § 3501, even though the Court's ruling would
preclude any other supportive arguments from ever being raised.
In Dickerson, with institutional representatives from Congress and
a significant number of states asking for clarification on an important
point of Miranda, it is hard to understand why the Court would not
say something about the issue.135 Moreover, the Court reached the

130. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives in Support of Affirmance at 15-16, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for the States of South Carolina et al. as
Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance at 5-16, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525);
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. Urging Affirmance at 7-9,
Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
131. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336-37 n.8.
132. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532 n.13 (1979) (emphasis added); see also United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981) (declining to reach issue "since it
was not raised by either of the parties here or below"); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S.
361, 370 (1960) (declining to reach argument that "has never been advanced by petitioners in
this case").
133. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942) ("[T]he proper administration
of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of the parties.").
134. The Court allows greater freedom in responding to a question presented, because a
respondent may, without cross-petitioning, "urge any grounds which would lend support to
the judgment below," Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977),
including "grounds different from those upon which the court below rested its judgment."
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940).
135. Presumably the House of Representatives could have intervened in Dickerson to
defend the statute, an action which would seem to have given it "party" status for purpose of
having its arguments considered. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see gener
ally, Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970
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larger issue of whether Miranda should be overruled in its entirety an issue not squarely presented in any amicus brief. It is difficult to
understand why the Court would reach, on its own initiative, this
broader question of whether to overrule Miranda, but not the nar
rower question subsumed within it of whether to modify one particu
lar facet of Miranda.
* * * * *

In short, what the Court could have said in upholding § 3501 was
this: The power to promulgate prophylactic rules protecting constitu
tional rights is not unlimited. The Court, no less than Congress, is
bound by the principle of City of Boerne that prophylactic rules must
be "congruent and proportionate" to the underlying constitutional
right. To make Miranda's procedures congruent and proportionate to
the Fifth Amendment, the failure to follow the procedures in obtain
ing a confession will raise a presumption of involuntariness, a pre
sumption that can be rebutted by appropriate evidence of voluntari
ness.
IV. SECTI ON 3501 AS RE F LE C TI NG C ONG RESSI ONA L FA CT FI N DI NG
ON MIRANDA 'S HA RM
This Article has thus far sketched three alternative resolutions of
the Dickerson case, resolutions that would have largely reconciled the
Court's varying pronouncements on Miranda doctrine without re
quiring the Court to abandon the Miranda framework. But, because
Dickerson itself ultimately reached the broader question of whether to
retain Miranda, it is appropriate for this Article to say a few words
about the stare decisis issue. On this question, too, Dickerson jarringly
departed from other Court holdings.
A. Failing to Consider Miranda's Costs
Stare decisis requires a consideration of the arguments for and
against retaining a legal rule, with the balance tipped from the start in
favor of retention.1 36 When considering whether to modify other
precedents, the Court has routinely assessed cost as part of the in
quiry.1 37 In the Miranda context, a critical issue would be the cost of
(1983). It truly elevates form over substance to refuse to consider the arguments by the
House because they were instead presented in the form of an amicus brief.
136. I should emphasize that I in no way question stare decisis doctrine. Cf Gary
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 23 (1994);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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the decision, measured in terms of its harms to law enforcement. In
deed, the legitimacy of inquiring into cost can be traced to Miranda
itself, where the Court promised that its decision was "not intended to
hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating
crime."138 In later rulings, too, the Court has described Miranda as "a
carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendants'
and society's interests,"139 further underscoring the need to consider
Miranda's effect on prosecution.
This question of Miranda's costs is a purely empirical one, requir
ing calculation of how many dangerous criminals go free as a result of
the Miranda rules. In our system of government, Congress is the
branch charged with reviewing such issues. As the Court has acknowl
edged, Congress has superior fact-finding powers because it is not
"bound by the parties' submissions; rather, it can conduct hearings,
canvass constituents, and obtain information from a broad range of
sources."14° Congress "is far better equipped than the judiciary to
amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative
questions."141 Academic commentators have also recognized
Congress's comparative advantage.142
Because of Congress's comparative advantage in assembling in
formation, the Court has routinely given great weight to congressional
factual findings in evaluating the constitutionality of federal statutes.
A prime illustration comes from United States v. Morrison,143 decided
just five weeks before Dickerson. There, the Court invalidated the
civil suits provision in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on
grounds that they exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Both the five justices in the majority and the four justices in
dissent prominently discussed the existence and effect of congressional
findings on the effect of violence against women on interstate com
merce. The majority acknowledged, and did not question, the congres
sional finding "regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated
violence has on victims and their families. "144 The dissent asserted that
1 38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
139. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986).
1 40. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 185, 281 [herein
after O'Neill, Undoing]; see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, Miranda Remediated, 3
G REENBAG 149 (2000) [hereinafter O'Neill, Remediated].
141. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1944); accord Walters v. Nat'! Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985).
142. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 7, at 1066-68 (2001) (taking this view and collecting sup
porting citations).
143. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
144. Id. at 1752. Nonetheless, for the majority these findings could not be given decisive
weight on the ultimate question of effect on interstate commerce because "they rely so
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"[t]he business of the courts is to review the congressional assessment,
not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a
jurisdictional basis exists in fact."145
The same kind of findings that confronted the Court in Morrison
existed in Dickerson. As ably recounted in Professor Michael O'Neil's
recent article,146 the Senate Judiciary Committee held a series of
hearings on how the Miranda rules were affecting day-to-day law en
forcement. The Committee ultimately concluded that the "rigid and
inflexible requirements" established in Miranda were "unreasonable,
unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforcement."147 The
Committee cited various studies demonstrating Miranda's harmful ef
fect on prosecuting crimes.148 These conclusions impelled Congress to
pass § 3501.
Perhaps one might argue that the Congressional factfinding proc
ess was flawed in various ways. For example, Professor Yale
Kamisar's interesting and extended analysis of the "tone" of the leg
islative process leads him to believe that Congress acted without care
ful deliberations.149 Whatever the merits of Kamisar's view, it is hard
to see how the quality of the congressional debate has a bearing on the
weight to be given to the findings. Within our scheme of separated
powers, the Court has no role in kibitzing on the way in which
Congress reaches its decisions.150 Moreover, Kamisar's review focuses
primarily, if not exclusively, on Congress's legal determinations about
the constitutionality of § 3501 not Congress's factual determinations
about the underlying harm to law enforcement.151 Because of his focus
on jurisprudential issues, Kamisar does not appear to dispute that, in
1968, Congress had ample evidence from police administrators and
prosecutors that Miranda was hampering their efforts to bring danger
ous criminals to book.152 Kamisar's article does not substantively dis-

heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to
maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers." This mixed question of fact and law
was, the majority concluded, for the judiciary.
145. Id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. O'Neill, Undoing, supra note 140, at 210-33.
147. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132.
148. See id. at 42, 45, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128, 2131-32.
149. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 894 (2000).
150. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558-59
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 5 1. See Kamisar, supra note 149, at 910 (giving five reasons for disbelieving
Committee's analysis on the constitutionality of § 3501).
152. Professor Kamisar does point to a "conspicuous absence of any law professors at
subcommittee hearings" as one reason for not crediting the Senate Judiciary Committee's
report. Id. at 902. While I am sure many of us in the academy will find merit in Kamisar's
suggestion that academics are vital to congressional deliberations, this is no requirement for
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cuss statistical presentations made to the Senate Judiciary Committee
by, among others, District Attorney Frank Hogan of New York
County,153 then-District Attorney Arlen Spector of Philadelphia,154 and
District Attorney Aaron Koota of Kings County, New York.155 While
one might draw different conclusions from this data,156 Congress's de
termination does seem to be, at the very least, one quite reasonable
interpretation. Traditionally, reasonableness is all that the Court has
required of Congress in evaluating the factual underpinnings of legis
lation.157
Alternatively, the Court might have concluded that the congres
sional determinations had become outdated by the time Dickerson ar
rived at the Court in 2000, since Congress reached its conclusions in
1968. Yet it is hard to understand how congressional findings could be
made to have any sort of expiration date, particularly where more re
cent congressional hearings have tended to reaffirm Congress's earlier
action.158 More importantly, Miranda itself was predicated on the
promise that its rules would not "constitute an undue interference
with a proper system of law enforcement."159 Miranda's predictive
claim - made, of course, in 1966 without the benefit of real world
evaluation of the new rules160 - would have to give way to congres
sional factfinding based on their actual operation.
Faced with such unattractive grounds for dealing with the congres
sional findings, Dickerson adopted a remarkable approach: it ignored
crediting legislative findings. Also, other defenders of Miranda did testify at the hearings.
See, e.g. , Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 1 159 (1967) (hereinafter Controlling Crime Hearings) (statement of Vincent L.
Broderick on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
153. See id. at 1 120-23.
154. Id. at 200-02.
155. Id. at 223.
156. Compare, e.g., Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 1 1 1 , at 395-418 (using the studies as
reason for finding significant harm from Miranda), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
500, 516-47 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Practical Effect] (reading the same studies differ
ently).
157. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (1981) (in evaluating the constitu
tionality of a statute, "[t]he District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent
evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an appropriately deferential examination of
Congress' evaluation of that evidence").
158. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 1, at 208-09 (noting congressional hearings urging the
Justice Department to enforce § 3501); see also infra notes 1 85-196 and accompanying text
(noting efforts of Senators Hatch and Thurmond to support § 3501).
159. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1 961).
160. The Court claimed that the FBI had operated under similar rules, but this claim
was transparently flawed. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 48-49 (1 986),
reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 501-02 (1989) [hereinafter OLP REPORT].
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them. In deciding to retain Miranda, the Court simply offered its own
independent determination that Miranda had not been so harmful as
to require modification. In brief concluding paragraphs on this issue,
Dickerson first quoted Chief Justice Burger's concurring view, in a
1980 case, that "[t]he meaning of Miranda has become reasonably
clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its stricture; I
would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late
date."161 Dickerson next asserted that "Miranda has become embed
ded in routine police practices to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture"162 and that the Court's "subse
quent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate
law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling . . . . "163
Finally, the Court maintained that a totality-of-the-circumstances, vol
untariness test "is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement of
ficers to conform to . . . . "164
What is obviously missing from Dickerson's analysis is any ac
knowledgment - let alone analysis - of congressional fact-finding on
these very issues. This was a dramatic departure from the approach of
Morrison and many other cases recognizing congressional primacy on
factfinding.165 Moreover, taken on their own merits, the Court's ar
ticulated reasons for finding Miranda not to be harmful are remarka
bly weak. With respect to Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that "law
enforcement practices have adjusted to [Miranda's] strictures," was
the Chief Justice asserting that law enforcement had accommodated to
Miranda, thereby avoiding harmful effects? Or, as seems more likely,
was he saying that law enforcement had reconciled itself to the harm
ful effects? This latter interpretation of Chief Justice Burger's remarks
would square his views with those of, for example, the nation's largest
law enforcement organization, the Fraternal Order of Police.166 When
deciding how to interpret his remarks, it is instructive that Chief
Justice Burger, after retiring from the Court, held the view that
1 61 . Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
162. 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
163. Id.
1 64. Id.
165. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
166. See The Clinton Justice Department's Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary
Confessions: Hearings . . . of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (state
ment of Gilbert G. Gallegos, President of the Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police)
("Sometimes we hear the claim that police have 'learned to live with Miranda' as an argu
ment against any change in the rules used in our courts. If what is meant by this is that police
will do their very best to follow whatever rules the Supreme Court establishes, it is true po
lice have 'teamed [sic] to live with Miranda' . . . But if what is meant by this is that police
'live with' and do not care about the harmful effects of these Court rules, nothing could be
further from the truth . . . too often these rules interfere with the ability of police officers to
solve violent crimes and take dangerous criminals off the streets.").
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Miranda should be overruled.167 With respect to the Court's subse
quent cases reducing any harmful impact from Miranda, the Court did
not acknowledge that these modifications have been around
Miranda's edges. While the Court has created impeachment, deriva
tive use, and public safety exceptions, Miranda's basic rule excluding
non-Mirandized statements from the state's case-in-chief remains in
tact. The available empirical evidence suggests that these exceptions
have marginal effects at best. The public safety exception, for instance,
appears to apply in fewer than 1 % of all cases.168 Moreover, while it is
true that some post-Miranda issues have been resolved in favor of law
enforcement, it is equally true that others have been resolved in favor
of criminal defendants. No less a defender of Miranda than the re
doubtable Yale Kamisar has acknowledged that "it must also be said
that the new Court has interpreted Miranda fairly generously in some
important respects. "169 Those important respects include the waiver
rules dealing with the circumstances in which police can even ask
questions of suspects. In 1 981, the Court in Edwards v. Arizona cre
ated an absolute bar to questioning a suspect who requests counsel.170
In later decisions, the Court applied this "second layer of prophy
laxis"171 to questioning about even unrelated crimes172 and even to
questioning after counsel had been provided.173 It is precisely these
rules that law enforcement agencies like the FBI have identified as
producing most of Miranda's harm.174 It is thus entirely possible that
167. Interview with Timothy Flannigan, biographer of Chief Justice Burger, in
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 6, 2001). Part of his reasoning may have been that, contrary to his
1980 position that Miranda should neither be "disparaged" nor "extended," the Court had in
fact extended Miranda in various ways, including in particular the line of cases originating
with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which significantly restricts the ability of law
enforcement officers to question suspects. It is this line of cases that has been identified by
federal law enforcement agencies as creating the most harmful effects from Miranda. See
infra note 188 and accompanying text (noting FBI difficulties under Edwards line of cases).
168. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Em
pirical Study of the Effects a/Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 884-85 (1986).
169. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS 509 (9th ed. 1999); see also Kamisar, Congress, supra note 13, at 951
("[N]ot all the opinions written in confession cases over the past thirty years have saddened
the hearts of Miranda's friends.").
170. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
171. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991).
172. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
173. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
174. See Brief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Agents Association as Amicus
Curiae, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525); supra note 167
(noting concern of FBI about Edwards).
Edwards has been arguably weakened in one small respect. In Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 (1994), the Court held that a request for counsel had to be unambiguous to trigger
the questioning cutoff rules once a suspect had waived his right. Here again, however, the
empirical evidence suggests that this modification has not been particularly useful for law
enforcement. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168, at 860 (explaining that only 2.3% of cases
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the Court's recent modifications have increased, not decreased,
Miranda's societal' costs. Dickerson makes no attempt to assay the net
effect of the Court's varying decisions.
Finally, Dickerson's claim that it is more difficult for law enforce
ment officers to comply with a voluntariness test than deliver Miranda
warning demolishes a strawman. Federal officers were planning to de
liver Miranda warnings even if § 3501 had been upheld,175 which means
that whatever useful effect they provided law enforcement would have
been continued. In addition, the brightness of Miranda's "bright-line "
rule has also been oversold. Justice O'Connor, for example, wrote just
a few years before Dickerson that "Miranda creates as many close
questions as it resolves " 176 - a position that she simply abandoned
(without explanation) in joining the Dickerson opinion.177 But in the
final analysis, the overarching issue remains not how bright the rule is,
but the costs of the rule. Dickerson simply fails to offer any assessment
of these costs.
Setting aside the particular problems with Dickerson's specific
authorities, a more fundamental point is the Court's judicial vantage
point on Miranda. The Brethren all are handicapped in assessing the
harmful effects of restraints on law enforcement practices. By defini
tion, the Justices receive information only about cases that were suc
cessfully prosecuted - that is, cases in which police and prosecutors
were able to amass sufficient evidence to pursue the case (and ulti
mately have it find its way to the Supreme Court). In other words,
only cases that are formally charged fall within the ken of the judicial
system. The bulk of Miranda's costs lie hidden elsewhere - in cases
where Miranda prevents police from ever obtaining confessions vital
to successful prosecutions. In a trilogy of recent articles, I have offered
three different ways of calculating these hidden costs of Miranda:
through "before-after " studies of confession rates, analysis of the drop
in crime clearance rates after Miranda, and comparison of contempo
rary confession rates with those that prevailed at the time of
Miranda118 In 1968, the Senate Judiciary Committee looked at these
involved post-waiver invocations of rights, and all of those cases involved suspects who had
previously given incriminating information). The three cases involved suspects who had al
ready given incriminating information. Id. See generally William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mis
take, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (discussing infrequency of those who invoke rights
after waivers - "Conditional Talkers" in his lexicon).
175. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
176. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
177. See 120 S. Ct. at 2347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting politely this unexplained rever
sal by Justice O'Connor).
178. Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 1 1 1; Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Hand
cuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda 's Harmful Effects on Law Enforce
ment, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168. Three additional
reasons for believing that Miranda harmed law enforcement are the contemporary reports of
law enforcement officers to that effect, see Paul G. Cassell, Reply, All Benefits, No Costs:
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very same types of information in reaching its factual conclusion about
Miranda's harms.179 Dickerson does not explain what to make of the
social science data on Miranda's effects.180
B.

Law Enforcement Experience with Miranda

Perhaps the Court could have compensated for the inadequacies in
its judicial vantage point by relying on other sources of information. In
some Miranda cases, for example, the Court has alluded to law en
forcement experience as a basis for sustaining the Miranda rules.181
Dickerson, however, does not mention the numerous law enforcement
amicus briefs in the case - no doubt because these briefs flatly con
tradicted its position. In fact, what may have been the largest collec
tion of law enforcement groups ever to file briefs in a
Supreme Court case supported § 3501. Briefs urging affirmance of the
Fourth Circuit were filed by seventeen State Attorneys
General, the National District Attorneys Association, the FBI Agents
Association, the nation's largest rank and file law enforcement organi
zation (the Fraternal Order of Police), the nation's second largest rank
and file law enforcement organization (the National Association of
Police Organizations), the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, and a number of other groups.182 On the other side, not even a

The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1106-10 (1996); the
higher confession rates found in Britain and Canada, see Cassell, Social Costs, supra note
111, at 418-22; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 168, at 876-80; and the decline in innocent sus
pects who are exonerated through confessions, see Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent
from False Confessions and Lost Confessions - And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 497, 551 (1998). These positions, of course, have not been universally ac
cepted by legal academics. Compare, e.g., Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156,
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Em
pirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996), and John J. Donahue III, Did Miranda Di
minish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998), with, e.g., Laurie Magid, The
Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1251, 1286 (1999)
(book review) ("Professor Cassell's research is important because it does remind us that
Miranda imposes a cost on thousands of cases.").

179. See, e.g., Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 152, at 199, 726, 1092.
180. See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1010-11 (2001); Klein, supra note 7, at 1075-76.
181. See, e.g., Withrow, 507 U.S. at 713 (citing amicus brief from law enforcement
agency as a reason for not contracting Miranda).
182. The briefs are available on the Cassell website, supra note 44. The brief from the
IACP was nominally "in support of neither party" but was in substance fully supportive of
the Fourth Circuit's opinion. Brief of Amici Curiae for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., Joined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., the
National Sheriffs' Association, and the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, in Support
of Neither Party, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525), available
at Cassell website, supra note 44.
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single prominent law enforcement group would support Dickerson's
position.183
The Court did have one brief from a law enforcement agency
claiming that Miranda was not harmful. The Department of Justice's
brief claimed that "federal law enforcement agencies have concluded
that the Miranda decision itself generally does not hinder their inves
tigations."184 But this statement had been so thoroughly discredited by
the time of the oral argument that the Court understandably gave it no
weight.
After the Department filed its brief containing these representa
tions, Senators Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond wrote to the
Attorney General that they had received information that the Drug
Enforcement Administration had reached the opposite conclusion and
requested that the Attorney General "provide to us at your earliest
convenience an explanation for the seemingly misleading statements"
contained in the Department's brief.185 With its hand forced, the
Department of Justice released documents from federal law enforce
ment agencies about the effects of Miranda and lodged them with the
Court. The lodged materials came from a number of federal agencies,
including some (like the Internal Revenue Service) that presumably
only rarely conduct custodial interrogations and therefore only rarely
suffer any harm from the Miranda rules. Buried at the end of the
lodging were several memos from the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the federal agency that probably conducts a higher
percentage of custodial interrogations than any other federal law en
forcement agency. As had apparently been reported to Senators
Hatch and Thurmond, these memos indicated that the DEA had suf
fered serious harms from Miranda. In an undated memo written in
1998 by the DEA's Deputy Chief Counsel, the DEA explained that it
was in favor of the Department attempting to obtain a favorable ruling
on § 3501.186 In a memo dated October 13, 1999, the DEA's Chief of
183. A brief was filed by individual police officers supporting Dickerson, which also
contained two minor law enforcement groups: the Police Foundation and the National Black
Police Association (not to be confused with the National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives, the far more prominent representative of African-American law
enforcement officers). Brief of Griffin B. Bell et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Dickerson, 1 20 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). But the attorneys working on this brief were
unable to secure the assent of even a single major law enforcement organization for their
position, despite the fact (I have been reliably informed) that they called many of the same
nationally prominent groups that ultimately supported the Fourth Circuit.
184. Brief for the United States at 34, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
185. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General
Janet Reno (Feb. 15, 2000) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44); see also 146 CONG.
REC. S760 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
186. Letter from Robert C. Gleason, Deputy Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement
Agency, to Patty Stemler, Chief, Dep't of Justice Criminal Div., Appellate Section (undated)
(available on Cassell website, supra note 44).
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Operations reported that the agency's experience "highlight[s] the
need to reform the formal, prophylactic requirements of Miranda."187
Joining the DEA, the FBI also reported that offshoots of the Miranda
requirements, such as the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, have had "an
impact on numerous FBI investigations."188 As Senators Hatch and
Thurmond concluded after reviewing these materials, they seriously
undermine the impression created by the United States' merits brief
"that federal law enforcement agencies uniformly support the Justice
Department's decision in this case to challenge the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 3501."189
Yet the Department was not finished with its misleading effort to
minimize Miranda's damaging effects on federal law enforcement. The
Department came up with new statistics in its reply brief - filed
shortly before the oral argument. The Department's reply brief as
serted that, between 1989 and 1999, "according to the Justice
Department's records, federal courts suppressed approximately 78
statements under Miranda
i.e., one out of every 9,300 federal
prosecutions."190 This representation must have come as something of
a surprise to Senators on the Judiciary Committee. Several
Senators had previously requested from the Department comprehen
sive information about federal cases in which Miranda problems had
prevented prosecution so that they could illustrate the harms from
Miranda. In a 1997 response to the Senators, the Justice Department
had answered that " [t]he Department's filing system and records do
not readily yield a definitive list of such cases."191 The Department
therefore provided to the Senators only a list of cases in which "ad-

187. Letter from Richard A. Fiano, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency, to
Frank A.S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Policy Development,
Drug Enforcement Agency (Oct. 13, 1999) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44). In a
curious attempt to undercut these memos written in the ordinary course of business, the
DEA's politically-appointed General Counsel wrote a memo on February 22, 2000 Gust two
days before the Department's lodging with the Court and after the request from Senators
Hatch and Thurmond), that attempted to "clarify" some of the statements made in the ear
lier memos. Letter from Cynthia R. Ryan, Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Agency, to
Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, Dep't of Justice (Feb. 22, 2000) (available on Cassell
website, supra note 44).
188. Letter from Larry R. Parkinson, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of
Investigations, to Eleanor D. Acheson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Policy
Development, Drug Enforcement Agency (Oct. 1 9, 1999) (available on Cassell website, su
pra note 44).
189. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General
Janet Reno, supra note 185.
190. Reply Brief for the United States at 17-18, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
1 9 1 . Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative
Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to Senator Fred Thompson (Nov. 5, 1997), reprinted in The Clinton
Justice Department's Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary Confessions: Hearing before
the Senate Subcomm. on Crim. Justice Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. at 124 (1 999).
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verse Miranda rulings made by the federal courts have been reviewed
by the Solicitor General," an incomplete list which "no doubt excludes
a number of cases in which confessions were suppressed under
Miranda . . . . "192 It was this same incomplete list that the Department
was now attempting to pass off to the Court as a firm accounting of
Miranda's harm to law enforcement. A few days after the Department
filed its reply brief, Senators Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond sent a
letter to the Attorney General (with a copy to the Supreme Court)
powerfully challenging the accuracy of those figures. The Senators'
letter included more than eighty additional cases of statements sup
pressed under Miranda that were not included in the Department's
calculations
(more
than
doubling
the
figures
the
Department itself had come up with!) and explained how the
Department's representations were seriously misleading.193 Two days
later, the Solicitor General sent a letter to the Supreme Court admit
ting that dozens of the cases identified by the Senators were not in
cluded in the Department's calculations.194
While the misrepresentations in the Department's brief to the
Court are very troubling, perhaps even more disturbing was the
Department's refusal to give weight to the congressional findings of
harm. While the Department's brief tersely mentioned the congres
sional findings,195 the Department nonetheless believed it was free to
revisit the evidence on its own rather than follow its traditional role of
defending congressional laws and conclusions.196 It was only because of
Senators Hatch and Thurmond's prompt response that this strategy
did not succeed in keeping from the Court considerable evidence of
Miranda's harm.
This evidence of harm posed a dilemma to the Dickerson majority
on the stare decisis question. It was no doubt aware that the potential
costs of the Dickerson decision were crucial to any stare decisis calcu
lus. At the same time, the Court was confronted with a congressional
determination that Miranda's costs were substantial, findings sup192 Id.
193. Letter from Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Strom Thurmond to Attorney General
Janet Reno and Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman (Apr. 18, 2000) (available on Cassell
website, supra note 44).
194. Letter from Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman to General William K. Suter, Clerk,
United States Supreme Court (Apr. 20, 2000) (available on Cassell website, supra note 44).
195. Brief for the United States at 1 9-20, Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 995525).
196. See generally Cassell, supra note 1 , at 223-25 (criticizing the Department for failing
to defend § 3501). Cf Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the
Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (2000) (discussing
whether courts should have considered the statute without Justice Department prompting);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in De
ciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000) (same).
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ported by numerous social science studies, law enforcement amicus
briefs, and the recent conclusions of the DEA and FBI. In the face of
this evidence, any serious effort by the Court to grapple with the stare
decisis issues would have required the Court to acknowledge that
Congress could have reasonably concluded that dangerous criminals
were going free because of Miranda. Instead, the Court took the easy
way out - it dodged the issue.
* * * * *

In short, what the Court could have said in Dickerson was this:
There is a factual question about whether Miranda has harmed legiti
mate law enforcement efforts. Congress is the branch of government
charged with resolving such questions. Congress held hearings on this
subject and reasonably concluded that Miranda was seriously ham
pering police efforts to solve crime and convict criminals. As a re
sult, . . . . .
V.

A LTERNATIVES TO MIRANDA

what would have been the result of Dickerson properly ac
knowledging that there was harm to law enforcement from Miranda?
Does it necessarily follow that Miranda should have been overruled?
Such harm would, at a minimum, be relevant to the Court's calcu
lation whether to retain Miranda or return to the earlier voluntariness
regime. The Court's stare decisis j urisprudence explicitly acknowl
edges the relevance of real-world effects. In deciding whether to over
rule Roe v. Wade, for instance, the controlling opinion from the Court
described the decision to overrule as "customarily informed by a series
of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . . "197 These considera
tions include "the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a
prior case."198 On this view, the "costs" of the Miranda rules are indis
putably part of the stare decisis calculation.199

197. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. As the Court's references to "costs" makes clear, the Court's own stare decisis ju
risprudence directly supplies an answer to Professor Susan Klein's query as to why data on
lost convictions should be relevant to Miranda jurisprudence. See Klein, supra note 7, at
1076 n.204. But Miranda doctrine as well has long made costs and benefits directly relevant.
See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986) (describing Miranda as "a carefully
crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests"). Even
Miranda's most ardent supporters seem to agree. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The "Police Prac
tice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE
BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (noting that striking a balance "is the
way Miranda's defenders - not its critics - have talked about the case for the past twenty
years"); Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156, at 505 (agreeing that "the size of a legal
problem does matter"); see generally Tracey L. Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Transparent
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Starting from the proper premise that Congress reasonably found
Miranda to entail significant costs, it would have been interesting to
see how the Court then assessed the competing issues.200 Just exactly
how many murderers and armed robbers would the Court find it
worth setting free in the interests of retaining the Miranda rule? The
Court has not proven particularly adept at assessing such tradeoffs.201
In Miranda itself, for example, the Court appeared to balance com
peting concerns in ways that most Americans found objectionable.
Rather than linger over such difficult issues, it is understandable that
the Court simply chose to toss off cursory assertions about Miranda's
limited harm before galloping off to its disposition, leaving the hard
questions to be answered in, . . . er . . . , later law review symposia.202
But assuming that the Court had recognized Miranda's harms,
would overruling the decision have necessarily followed? Against
Miranda's disadvantages, the Court would have needed to assay the
advantages. Defenders of Miranda have claimed, for example, that
Miranda entails such benefits as reducing police coercion during the
questioning of suspects203 and communicating to suspects "our societal
commitment to restraint in an area in which emotions easily run un
controlled."204 Balancing these advantages against Miranda's disadvan
tages would have been difficult not only because of disagreement
about the existence of these benefits, but more generally because of a
commensurability problem - these concerns are not susceptible to
evaluation on a common scale.
A critique of Dickerson for reaching one conclusion or the other
on such contentious issues would probably never command broad as-

Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000).

200. To be clear, my argument is that the Court should have accepted Congress's factual
findings on harm (criminals going free), not that it should have deferred to the congressional
determination that interrogations are not inherently coercive. This latter conclusion, a mixed
question of fact and law, presents a more difficult case for deference to congressional find
ings than the purely factual findings discussed in the text. See generally Cassell, supra note 1 ,
a t 249 n.355 (collecting authorities o n the not-inherently-coercive argument).
201. Cf Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims'
Rights Amendment, 1 999 UTAH L. REV. 479 (discussing failures of the criminal justice sys
tem in recognizing victims' rights).
202. Cf Kamisar, supra note 7, at 897 (stating that Dickerson basically said, "Let the
professors figure it out.").
203. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 678 (1996). For a competing view of the evidence on this point, see, e.g.,
Cassell, supra note 111, at 473-78.
204. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 460 (1987).
For competing views of the message sent by Miranda, see, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW (1996); Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment
and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938,
948 (1987).

March 2001]

Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson

937

sent.205 But it seems to me that an alternative critique is available,
which might draw wider approval. Even assuming that the Court
properly struck down § 3501, the Dickerson opinion is deficient in
failing to discuss possible alternatives to Miranda that Congress could
adopt. Dickerson 's silence on reasonable alternatives starkly contrasts
with City of Chicago v. Morales,206 a case from the preceding Term. In
Morales, the Court struck down Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance
essentially on vagueness grounds. But the swing justices - Justice
O'Connor joined by Justice Breyer - wrote a concurring opinion ex
plaining how Chicago could cure the defects. This led
Chicago to adopt a new ordinance conforming precisely to the re
quirements spelled out in the concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor's
Morales concurrence illustrates what Professor Erik Luna has help
fully called a "constitutional roadmap."207 The controlling justices on
the Court gave guidance to Chicago so that Chicago's city council
could pass an ordinance that complied with the Constitution.
Dickerson should have followed Justice O'Connor's approach in
Morales - offering some instruction about why § 3501 and related en
actments were defective and what the Congress needed to do to sup
plement them. Perhaps some constitutional purists will demur. Tout
ing passive virtues and the like,208 they will suggest that the Court
should take the cases one at a time, leaving the possibility of alterna
tives to be resolved in a proper case and controversy. In many circum
stances, such arguments for judicial restraint might have considerable
force. But in the particular context of Miranda, the case for roadmap
ping becomes compelling.209 Miranda is "a decision without a past"210
- an opinion without foundation in the previous court precedents.211
As a result, in contrast with other bodies of law, conscientious legisla
tors lack authoritative guidance for any effort to determine what al
ternatives might satisfy the constitutional requirements. Dickerson of205. For this reason, among others, I have argued for replacing Miranda rather than
overruling it.
206. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
207. Erik Luna, Constitutional Roadmaps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000).
208. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L REV. 40
(1961). See generally Luna, supra note 207, at 1 1 73-85 (discussing various theories of inter
branch dialogue).
209. To be clear, Professor Luna reserves "for another day" the question of whether the
Court's "disinclination toward hearing political alternatives can serve as a constitutionally
legitimate motivation for judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing." Luna, supra note
207, at 1236 n.543. I want to argue here that, at least in the context of replacements for
Miranda, such disinclination is illegitimate, or at least inadvisable.
210. OLP REPORT, supra note 160, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 564 (1989).
21 1 . See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement: Some
Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327, 328 (1997) (collecting authorities
on this point).

938

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:898

fers no help to the legislature, since it merely offers an unexplained
"thumbs down" to the alternative before it, § 3501. Perhaps uncer
tainty might be tolerable if the legislature could simply authorize a test
case to explore the acceptability of alternatives to Miranda. But the
ability to test alternatives before the Court is limited. A decision by a
police agency to depart from Miranda and try some different device
risks suppression of a confession. If applied more widely - as might
be necessary to obtain appellate review of the issue212 - it runs the
risk of wholesale reversal of criminal convictions, years after the fact.
Dickerson was clearly an "opportunity missed"213 to make positive
reforms, and will continue the "petrification" of the law of pretrial in
terrogation in this country.214 For those who think Miranda is the be
all and end-all of rules for this area, perhaps this result will be ap
plauded. But it would be odd if a 1966, 5-4 decision by the
Supreme Court embodied the best possible resolution of the compet
ing concerns. Indeed, this Symposium provides considerable evidence
of dissatisfaction with Miranda from various quarters. For instance,
Professor Laurie Magid and I are concerned that Miranda unduly
harms law enforcement.215 But setting such concerns aside for the mo
ment, it is interesting to hear from Professor Welsh White that
Miranda fails to restrain pernicious interrogation practices,216 from
Professor Richard Leo that Miranda has few significant benefits,217 and
from Professor Susan Klein that Miranda fails to provide any real
guidance on what kinds of compulsion are permissible during police
questioning.218 Given these complaints, it is hard to fault Professor
William Stuntz's conclusion that "Miranda should attract support from
neither right nor left."219
This Symposium also provides considerable evidence for the solu
tion to Miranda defects - the proverbial "win-win" solution that
properly protects both suspects and society's legitimate interests.
Dickerson should have suggested to Congress that it consider replac
ing Miranda with a system of videotaping police questioning. Video
taping of interrogations improves on Miranda by providing an objec-

212. Cf Cassell, supra note 1, at 200-19 (reviewing protracted litigation involved in get
ting § 3501 before the Supreme Court).
213. Stuntz, supra note 174, at 976.
214. See OLP REPORT, supra note 160, at 99, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
548-49.
215. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1 168 (2001); supra Parts IV.A-B.
216. White, supra note 76, at 1220-21
217. Leo, supra note 180, at 1027.
218. Klein, supra note 7, at 1035.
219. Stuntz, supra note 174, at 976.
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tive record of what happened inside the stationhouse.220 Videotaping
thus allows courts to police the lines between proper and improper
tactics, rather than leaving that job to others.221 Videotaping would
also help reduce the number of wrongful convictions from false con
fessions by revealing those rare cases where suspects (particularly the
mentally retarded) are led to confess to crimes they did not commit.222
I have argued elsewhere that videotaping could largely replace the
Miranda regirne.223 Other commentators - including prominently
Stephen Schulhofer, Welsh White, and Richard Leo - have urged
that videotaping should supplement the Miranda regime.224 And be
tween these varying positions there certainly are a range of possibili
ties for using videotaping in combination with various parts of the
Miranda regirne.225 Yet the Court's opinion in Dickerson contains not
even the briefest discussion of this (or other) alternatives226 - it gives
no roadmap for legislators to follow. The result, not surprisingly, has
been inaction in Congress and legislatures on possible alternatives to
Miranda.227
Reasonable people can disagree about exactly which of these vari
ous alternatives would have been preferable. But if this
Symposium suggests nothing else, it is that society has compelling rea220. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111, at 486-92.
221. See Stuntz, supra note 174, at 999.
222. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111, at 488-89; Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and
the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction
from False Con.
fessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 582-84 (1999).
.

223. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 111, at 486-98; Cassell & Fowles, supra note
178, at 1 130.
224. See Leo, supra note 180, at 1028-29; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the
Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494-96 (1998);
Schulhofer, Practical Effect, supra note 156, at 503; Welsh S. White, False Confessions and
the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 105, 154-55 (1997).
225. For interesting arguments along these lines, see Friedman & Dorf, supra note 16;
DONALD DRIPPS, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DICKERSON,
MIRANDA , AND THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR BROAD-BUT-SHALLOW (2000) (arguing that
videotaping could replace the Edwards rules). My proposed videotape replacement for
Miranda also retains parts of the Miranda regime. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 1 1 1 ,
a t 486-98.
226. Another often-discussed alternative to Miranda is the questioning of suspects by
magistrates rather than police officers. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77 (1997); see also Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Ac
cused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
227. See Luna, supra note 207, at 1236-38 n.544.
The only post-Dickerson response in Congress was the introduction of a bill by Senator
Leahy that would have repealed the operative provisions of § 3501. S. 2830, 106th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2000). The bill went nowhere in the 106th Congress. Presumably the majority in Con
gress prefers the approach of § 3501, as evidenced by the amicus briefs in Dickerson, see su
pra note 130 and accompanying text.
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sons constantly to examine how to improve its regulations of police in
terrogation. Miranda itself recognizes this point. Miranda went out of
its way pointedly to "encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws."228 The Miranda Court explained that "we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution" to the issues lurking in police questioning of suspects.229
"Our decision," promised Miranda, "in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it in
tended to have that effect. "230
Thirty-four years later, the Dickerson Court chose not to repeat
this encouragement to Congress and the states; nor did it renew
Miranda's promise to avoid creating a constitutional straitjacket. In
stead, making a virtue out of vice, Dickerson tells us that the Miranda
procedures have become part of our "national culture"23 1 - a cultural
straitjacket presumably not susceptible to reform.
Miranda needs reform - a point many in this Symposium have
advanced. The true tragedy of Dickerson is, then, not the path that the
Court chose - but the paths that it seemingly foreclosed.

228. 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 120 S. Ct. at 2336.

